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Abstract: We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public 
signals, where the signals are the aggregate of many discrete events, such as sales or 
tasks. The high-frequency limit of the  equilibrium set depends on both the probability 
law governing the discrete events and on how many events are aggregated into a single  
signal. When the underlying events have a binomial distribution, the limit equilibria 
correspond to the equilibria of the associated continuous-time game with diffusion 
signals, but other event processes that aggregate to a diffusion limit can have a different 
set of limit equilibria. Thus the continuous-time game need not be a good approximation 
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1. Introduction 
We  study  the  limits  of  equilibria  of  repeated  games  with  imperfect  public 
information as the frequency of observations and actions grows to infinity. To highlight 
the role of the information structure, we focus games between one long-run player and a 
sequence of short-run opponents, as in the classic Klein and Leffler [1981] model of a 
long-run firm facing a sequence of consumers, each of whom purchases only once. In the 
Klein-Leffler  model,  each  period  the  firm  chooses  an  intended  quality  level  but  the 
production process is stochastic, so that the realized quality may differ from the intended 
one.
2 Consumers will only purchase if the firm is expected to try to produce high quality 
in the current period; the firm has a short-run incentive to cut costs and produce low 
quality,  but  there  can  be  equilibria  in  which  the  firm  tries  for  high  quality  to  avoid 
loosing  future  sales.
3  As  a  second  illustration,  the  non-strategic  players  could  be 
shareholders, and the long-run player the manager of the firm. The manager chooses an 
effort level, but this is not observed by the shareholders, who do observe the realized 
sales in each period. Because the long-run player’s action is observed with noise, the set 
of equilibria depends on the information structure, and typically efficient payoffs cannot 
be  approximated  by  equilibria,  even  in  the  limit  as  the  discount  factor  tends  to  1 
(Fudenberg and Levine [1994]).  
We show how the best equilibrium payoff for the long-run player depends on the 
information structure, and in turn on how the relevant characteristics of the information 
structure change as the observation period shrinks. 
4 Our work builds on our earlier paper 
Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2007a],  which  provides  general  conditions  for  a  sequence  of 
discrete-time  games  with  period  length  going  to  zero  to  have  a  non-trivial  limit 
equilibrium. Using the general result from the earlier paper, we can reduce the study of 
                                                 
2 In the original Klein-Leffler model, the production technology was deterministic. 
3 The key aspect of these “short run players” is that they are strategically myopic and do not try to influence 
the future play of the long run player. The same analysis applies when the “short run players” are replaced 
by a continuum of infinitesimal long-lived players, with the large player observing only the aggregate play 
of the small ones.  
4 In more general games, the set of equilibrium payoffs will depend on the information structure in more 
complicated  ways,  but  our  calculation  of  the  “limit  informativeness”  of  various  sequences  of  signal 
structures will still apply.   
   2 
the  limit  equilibria  to  the  analysis  of  the  “asymptotic  informativeness”  of  the  signal 
structure. The per-event informativeness is all that matters if players observe each event 
separately, yet many processes with different per-event informativeness converge to the 
same  diffusions.  This  is  why  the  equilibria  of  the  controlled-diffusion  case  can  be 
different  than  the  limit  equilibria.  In  some  cases,  frequent  interactions  permit  fully 
efficient outcomes, for example if consumers receive such accurate information that the 
firm  can  be  induced  to  almost  always  produce  high  quality.  In  other  cases,  the 
equilibrium set collapses in the limit, and only the static equilibrium can be supported, so 
that the firm produces low quality forever.   
We focus on cases where the public signal is an aggregate of several or many 
discrete events, such as sales, price changes, or components of quality, and in particular 
to the case where the distribution of this aggregate converges to a diffusion process.  We 
feel that this is of relevance  for interpreting results about continuous time games where 
players observe the state of a diffusion process, as in Sannikov [2007a], Sannikov and 
Skrypcaz  [2007],  Faingold  and  Sannikov  [2007]  and  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2007a], 
because in most settings of interest the diffusion assumption is an approximation for a 
sum of discrete events.
5  
We examine various ways of sending the time period of the game to zero and 
passing to a continuous-time limit. Our main point is that these limits all correspond to 
the idea that players act “very frequently,” but the same limiting signal distribution may 
correspond to ways of passing to the limit that have very different limit equilibria. We 
also highlight the role of “information aggregation” in determining the limit equilibrium 
payoffs. That is, we ask when does observing the sum of many signals lead to a larger 
limit equilibrium set than observing the signals one at a time? Our previous paper showed 
that there are efficient limit equilibria if deviations increase the volatility of the diffusion, 
but not when deviations decrease the volatility. We relate the differing conclusions in 
these  two  cases  to  their  differing  aggregation  properties:  when  deviating  leads  to 
increased volatility, the signal structure is more informative when players observe the 
aggregate of the discrete events instead of observing each event as it occurs, and the   3 
informativeness becomes infinite as players aggregate more and  more observations; this 
is not the case when deviating lowers volatility. Finally, our results show that the usual 
continuous-time games with controlled diffusions correspond to some but not all of the 
ways that the discrete-time observation structures can converge to a diffusion, so the 
standard continuous-time model is “too small” to incorporate all of the relevant limit 
objects.
6 
Like the earlier paper, this one is related to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce [1991], 
who studied the strongly  symmetric pure-strategy equilibria of a repeated partnership 
game in discrete time when players observe the realization of a Poisson process. Our 
work is also similar to Sannikov and Skrypacz [2007]. They consider a game with two 
long-run  players  observing  the  infinite-dimensional  sample  path  of  a continuous-time 
process at discrete intervals. Instead of considering games with two long-run players, we 
study a game with a single long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents, 
each of whom plays only once but knows about past outcomes. Unlike Sannikov and 
Skrypacz, we allow mixed as well as pure strategies. 
Our work is related to papers that construct a series of discrete-time games whose 
limit equilibria correspond to the equilibria of the continuous-time game with diffusion 
signals, as in Hellwig and Schmidt [2002] and Sannikov [2007b].  The main difference is 
in focus: The earlier papers are in the spirit of a lower hemicontinuity argument, showing 
that there exists a sequence of discrete-time games that provide a foundation for the limit 
game; our work points to, loosely speaking, a failure  of upper hemicontinuity.  
On  a  more  practical  level,  the  equilibria  of  games  played  at  high  but  finite 
frequency  depends  on  the  informativeness  of  the  available  signals.  Even  when  these 
signals can be well approximated by a diffusion, the equilibria of the standard continuous 
time models may not be a good approximation of the finite-frequency equilibria, unless 
the underlying signal process is binomial. Otherwise, whether or not the continuous time 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Diffusion processes are continuous, yet processes such as sales or price are inherently discrete, and so 
players  would  observe  at  most  a  single  transaction  in  each  period  if  they  monitor  the  process  at  a 
sufficiently high frequency. 
6 This suggests that one might want to construct a larger space of continuous-time games, as done by  
Fudenberg and Tirole [1985] and Simon and Stinchcombe [1989] in a related context, but that remains a 
topic for future work.   4 
results  are  relevant  is  an  empirical  issue,  and  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
periods being short. 
2. The Model 
A  long-run  player  1  plays  a  stage  game  with  a  short-run  player  2  who  is 
completely  impatient.    To  focus  attention  on  the  information-theoretic  aspects  of  the 
problem we restrict attention to the following 2x2 stage game 
 
  Player 2 
  Out   In 
+1  u,0  u ,1 
 
Player 1 
-1  u,0  u g + ,-1 
Table 1: Stage-Game Payoffs 
 
where  u u <   and  0 g > .  In  the  stage  game,  player  2  plays  Out  in  every  Nash 
equilibrium, so player 1’s static Nash equilibrium payoff is u, which is also the minmax 
payoff for player 1. Naturally player 1 would prefer that player 2 play In but he can only 
induce player 2 to play In by avoiding playing –1.   The highest feasible payoff for player 
1 is u g + . The Stackelberg payoff of   /2 u g +  can be obtained by a publicly observed 
commitment to play the mixed strategy (1/2, 1/2,)  but the highest repeated game payoff 
is u  when actions are observed (Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin [1990]) and the highest 
payoff with imperfect public monitoring is strictly less than that (Fudenberg and Levine 
[1994]).   Our focus will be on determining when the repeated game with vanishingly 
small time periods has equilibria with normalized discounted payoffs that exceed u, and 
when it has equilibria with payoff approaching u , which we refer to as the  “first-best” 
payoff.  
  When  the  game  is  repeated,  the  length  of  a  period  is  τ ,  and  the  subjective 
continuous time interest rate for the long-run player is r , so that her rate of time discount 
is  r e τ δ − = . Each period, the stage game is played, and then the long-run player and 
subsequent short-run players observe a public signal  z ∈ ￿ that depends only on the 
action  1 a  of the long-run player. The public signal has finite support; its distribution is 
described by the density function  1 ( | , ) f z a τ . In addition, we assume that the support of   5 
the signal is independent of the action played, so that every possible signal has positive 
probability under every action.  
There is also a publicly observed public randomization device each period before 
actions  are  taken.  The  public  history  is  the  history  of  the  signal  and  the  public 
randomization device.
7 Our solution concept is perfect public equilibrium or PPE: these 
are strategy profiles for the repeated game in which (a) each player’s strategy depends 
only on the public information, and (b) no player wants to deviate at any public history.
8 
   The characterization of perfect public equilibria in this setting is straightforward, 
using  standard  dynamic  programming  techniques  in  the  spirit  of  Abreu,  Pearce  and 
Stachetti  [1990].  Because  we  allow  public  randomization,  the  set  of  perfect  public 
equilibrium  payoffs  to  LR  is  a  line  segment  between  a  best  and  worst  equilibrium; 
because the static Nash equilibrium involves no entry and gives LR her minmax, the 
worst equilibrium is for LR to get  u. So the set of PPE payoffs to the LR player is 
completely  described  by  its  upper  bound,  which  we  denote  by 
* v .
9  Proposition  1  in  
Appendix 1 shows that 
* v  can be computed as the solution to a static linear programming 
problem, where the control variables are the “continuation payoffs”  ( ) w z  that the player 
expects to receive following each signal z ; this result is used in the proof of our next 
proposition.  
 Now suppose that the continuation payoffs are restricted to the two values 
* v  
(“reward”) and  u (“punishment”). Define  p as the probability of punishment when the 
action chosen is +1 (that is,  p is the probability under action +1 of signals such that 
continuation play is “punishment”) and define  q  as the probability of the punishment 
outcome when the action chosen is –1. We say that a pair ( , ) p q is feasible  if it can be 
generated by some specification of the function w. 
                                                 
7 Technically speaking the public information also includes the short-run player’s action, but since public 
randomizations are available we can restrict attention to strategies that ignore the past actions of the short-
run player, and obtain the same set of outcomes of perfect public equilibria. To see this, observe that 
continuation  payoffs  can  always  be  arranged  by  a  public  randomization  between  the  best  and  worst 
equilibrium. If continuation payoffs depend on the play of the short-run player, the long-run player cares 
only about the expected value conditional on the signal of his own play. Since that expected value lies 
between the best and worst equilibrium, there is an equivalent equilibrium in which the continuation value 
is constant and equal to the conditional expected value. 
8  See  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  [1991]  for  a  definition  of  this  concept  and  an  example  of  a  non-public 
equilibrium in a game with public monitoring. 
9 The arguments of Fudenberg and Levine [1983] or Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti [1990] can be adapted to 
show that the set of PPE payoffs in this game is compact, so the best PPE payoff is well-defined.   6 
Proposition 2: (Fudenberg and Levine [2007a])   
(a) For a fixed discount factor  δ, there is an equilibrium with the long-run player’s 
payoff above u if and only if there are feasible   , [0,1] p q ∈  that satisfy   
 
( )( ) (1 )
1





− ≥ .  (*) 
In this case the highest  PPE payoff to the long-run player is  






.  (**) 
When (*) is not satisfied, the highest PPE payoff is u.  
(b) There is a PPE  that supports the highest PPE payoff that has the “cutoff likelihood 
property:” There is a cutoff  * λ  such that if  1 1 ( | 1, )/ ( | 1, ) * f z a f z a τ τ λ = − = + >  
then  ( ) w z u = , if  1 1 ( | 1, )/ ( | 1, ) * f z a f z a τ τ λ = − = + <  then  ( ) * w z v = .
10  
Note that the best equilibrium  * v  is close to the first best if there are feasible ( , ) p q  with 
/( ) p q p −  small.  
3. Continuous-Time Limits 
Our interest is in how the set of PPE payoffs varies with the period length, and in 
particular its behavior as the time period shrinks to zero. We consider then families of 
games indexed by the period length  τ . We must now describe how the signal  z  varies 
with the period length τ . Our basic scenario is that z  is an aggregate of discrete random 
variables representing, for example, sales, prices, or other transaction data.
11 Specifically, 
we  suppose  that  z   is  the  sum  of  some  number  of  “events,”  by  which  we  mean 
independent identically distributed random variables  j Z  whose support is a fixed finite 
set, regardless of the action profile.  
                                                 
10  Note  that  when  the  likelihood  ratio  is  exactly  * λ   the  continuation  value  may  lie  anywhere  in  the 
interval
* [ , ] u v . 
11 This model does not capture the case where the signal involves an occasional catastrophic event, such as 
a  failed  surgery,  bad  reaction  to  a  drug,  or  airplane  crash.  That  type  of  signal  is  better  modeled  in 
continuous time as a Poisson process. See Celentani, Levine and Martinelli [2007].   7 
Recall that the length of a period, that is, the time between moves, is  τ ; the 
“observation frequency” we mentioned in the introduction is thus  /τ 1 . We assume that 
the length of time between events (that is between realizations of the  j Z ) is  τ ∆ ≤ , so 
that  the  event  frequency  is  / 1 ∆.  We  are  interested  in  the  case  in  which  0 τ →  
(implying  that  0 ∆ →   as  well).  It  is  convenient  to  assume  that  τ   is  a  specified 
continuous  strictly  increasing  function  of  ∆  with  (0) 0 τ = .  We  then  define 
( ) ( )/ k τ ∆ = ∆ ∆; players observe the integer number  ( ) k   ∆    of signals when the time 
between moves is  ( ) τ ∆ . In general, we allow the distribution of  j Z  and its support to 
depend on ∆, and to emphasize this dependence we will write  ( ) j Z ∆ . (Recall that this is 
necessary for the distribution of the aggregate  z  to approach a diffusion.) However we 
will assume that the cardinality of the support of  ( ) j Z ∆  is a constant, independent of ∆.  
The  information  available  at  the  end  of  the  period  beginning  at  t   is  the 
signal
 
  ( )/
/ ( )
t
j j t z Z
+ ∆
= ∆ = ∆ ∑
τ
. Our goal is to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs 
in the limit. Specifically, if for a given interest rate r  there are  positive  τ  and  ε such 
that for all non-negative smaller values  0 < < τ τ  the game with period length  τ  and 
interest rate r  has an equilibrium with payoff at least u ε + , we say that there is a non-
trivial limit equilibrium for r .  If there is any positive interest rate r  for which there is a 
non-trivial limit equilibrium, we say simply that there is a non-trivial limit equilibrium.  
If for all  0 r >  and all sequences  0 τ →  the equilibrium payoff converges to u we say 
there is only a trivial limit. (In principle there can be cases where the limit depends on the 
sequence  chosen,  however,  we  do  not  provide  names  for  these  cases.)  If  there  is  an 
0 r >   such  that  for  all  0 r r < < ,  all  0 ε > ,  and  all  sequences  0 τ → ,  there  is  a 
sequence of equilibria with payoff converging to u − ε we say there is an efficient limit 
equilibrium. If for all ( , ) (0,0) r τ →  there are equilibria that have payoffs converging to 
u , we say that there is an efficient patient equilibrium. 
12 
   
                                                 
12 Note that the definition of a non-trivial limit equilibrium allows the interest rate r  to be arbitrarily small, 
but it requires that the payoff in question to be supportable as an equilibrium when that interest rate is held 
fixed as the period length τ  goes to 0.  The definition of an efficient patient equilibrium allows the interest 
rate to go to 0 as well. However the efficient payoff must be attained in the limit regardless of the relative 
rates at which τ  and r  converge, so that in particular efficiency must be obtained if we first send τ  to 0 
with r  fixed and only then decrease r . The other order of limits, with r  becoming small for fixed  τ , 
corresponds to the usual folk-theorem analysis in discrete-time games.   8 
  The  following  corollaries  all  apply  to  sequences  of  equilibria  for  the  games 
indexed  by  observation  period  τ .  First,  for  each  fixed  τ   we  define 
( ) ( ( ) ( ))/ ( ) q p p = − ρ τ τ τ τ   which  we  may  view  as  the  signal  to  noise  ratio  for    the  
specified equilibrium. From (**) we see that if  *( ) v u > τ , then it must be that  





ρ τ . 
We  also  see  that  in  order  for  the  payoffs  to  converge  to  u   it  must  be  that 
0 lim ( ) → → ∞ τ ρ τ ;  it  will  be  helpful  to  remember  that  0 lim ( ) → → ∞ τ ρ τ   implies 
( ) 0 p τ → .  
Corollary 1:
13  
(a)  If  for  some  sequence  ( , ) (0,0) r τ →   there  is  no  sequence  of  equilibria  with 
( ) → ∞ ρ τ  then there is not an efficient patient equilibrium. 
(b) If for all  0 r > , all sequences  0 τ → , and all equilibria,  ( ) 0 → ρ τ , then there is 
only a trivial limit equilibrium. 
(c)  If  for  all 0 r >   and  all  sequences    0 τ →   there  is  an  0 ε >   and  a  sequence  of 
equilibria with  





ρ τ ε  
and  ( ) p τ  bounded away from 0, there is a non-trivial limit equilibrium for any r . 
 






ρ τ implies  that  the  LHS  of  (*)  is  positive,  so  *
0 lim ( ) v u → > τ τ   in  cases 
where the RHS of (*) converges to 0, which is true in particular when  ( ) p τ  is bounded 
away from 0. 
In many cases of interest, the best equilibria will have  ( ) p τ  converging to 0.  
Corollary 2:  
                                                 
13 Our earlier paper states a result  with the same conclusion under the  additional hypothesis that the 
sequence of equilibria is “regular,” meaning that  ( ) ρ τ  and  ( ) ( ( ) )/ q p τ τ τ −  both converge.   9 
(a)  If  for  all  0 r >   and  all  sequences 0 τ → ,  along  any  sequence  of  best  equilibria 
( ) /( ) g u u > − ρ τ  implies  / 0 q τ → , then there is only a trivial limit.
14  
(b) If for every  0 θ >  and every sequence ( , ) (0,0) r τ →  there is a sequence of equilibria 
with  ( )/ q ≥ τ τ θ  and  ( ) → ∞ ρ τ , then there is an efficient patient equilibrium 
(c) If there is an  0 r >  such that for all  0 r r < < , every  1 > λ  and every sequence 
0 τ →  there is a sequence of equilibria with  ( ) p τ  constant and  0 lim ( )/ ( ) q p → = τ τ τ λ 
then there is an efficient limit equilibrium.  
Proof: We can rewrite (*)  as  










,  where  ( ) ( 1)/ r e r = − τ ν τ τ  



















which it converges as ρ → ∞.   
This immediately yields parts (a) and (b). For (c), note that when λ  is sufficiently 
large, the LHS of (*) is positive and bounded away from 0; the RHS converges to 0, so 
using the strategies that generate these probabilities yields a non trivial limit equilibrium, 
and the payoff to this equilibrium converges to u  as λ → ∞. 
￿ 
4. Converging to Diffusions 
We  now  restrict  attention  to  information  processes  that  converge  to  diffusion 
processes  in  the  limit,  because  we  want  to  relate  this  limit  to  the  predictions  of 
continuous-time  controlled-diffusion  models.    The  idea  is  that  the  diffusion  process 
reflects the aggregation of information, with the limiting normal distribution arising from 
central limit theory. 
Our basic diffusion hypothesis is that for each fixed action  1, 1 i = + −  of the 
long-run player the sum    /
1 ( )
t
j j z Z
∆
= = ∆ ∑  converges to a diffusion as  0 ∆ → . That is, 
                                                 
14 The best equilibrium payoff exists for each τ  but there may be multiple equilibria with this payoff.   10 
in the limit  0 ∆ → , when the long-run player’s action is held fixed from time 0 to any 
time t, the value of the observed signal at time t is a normally distributed random variable  
with mean  it µ  and standard deviation 
2
it σ .  We continue to assume that the support of 
the  z ’s is independent of the action chosen, so that when  τ = ∆ and players observe 
each individual realization of  ( ) j Z ∆ , no outcome perfectly reveals which of the two 
actions  was  played.  As  ∆  and  τ   converge  to  0,  the  distribution  of  the  ( ) j Z ∆ will 
change; we let f
∆ denote the  ( ) j Z ∆ , and f
τ  the density of the aggregate z.  
The  ( ) j Z ∆  represent underlying economic events that are being aggregated. As 
long as their distribution is well behaved, the central limit theorem applies and each of 
the triangular arrays converges to a diffusion.
15 In fact, many different distributions on 
the  ( ) j Z ∆  may generate the same diffusion. Our goal is to understand whether the limit 
diffusion is sufficient to characterize the set of limit equilibria or whether the details of 
the particular triangular array matter. In practice, the distribution of the underlying events 
depends on the situation being modeled. In some settings it is natural to think of the data 
as having a binomial distribution. For example, if the data being observed is sales data, 
and the items being sold are cars or refrigerators or other large durable goods, then it is 
reasonable to think that a consumer either buys the item or not, but does not buy several 
at once. On the other hand for goods sold by volume or weight each individual sale can 
take on many different values, so the underlying data being aggregated has a non-trivial 
distribution of its own. 
We take up first the simplest case, that where the underlying  ( ) j Z ∆ do in fact 
follow a binomial distribution.  This distribution has the special feature that its mean and 
the variance are linked to each other: the variance is equal to the product of the mean and 
one  minus  the  mean.  As  the  next  result  shows,  this  link  between  the  mean  and  the 
variance implies that two binomial arrays that converge to diffusions and have common 
outcomes must have the same volatility.    
                                                 
15 The Lindberg-Feller condition for the central limit theorem is that the  ( ) j Z ∆ s have finite mean and 
variance;  to apply this to arrays,  where the probability  law changes  with∆ , it is sufficient that these 
bounds hold uniformly in ∆ .   11 
Proposition 3:  Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomials  ( ) j Z ∆  where the 
common  outcomes  are  ( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ ,  and  that  the  probability  of  ( ) x ∆   under  action 
1, 1 i = + −  is  ( ) i ∆ α  with  0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α . If under each action i the 





= ∆ ∑ converge  to  a  diffusion  with  drifts  i µ   and  volatilities   
2
i σ   as 
0 ∆ → , then 1 1 + − = σ σ . 
Proof: In Appendix 2.                                                                                                  ￿ 
 
The equal volatility case is important because in this case the equilibrium with 
respect to the limiting diffusions must be trivial. This does not necessarily imply that if 
triangular arrays converge to limit diffusions with the same volatility the limit equilibria 
are trivial. Indeed, the next section gives an example where the signals converge to equal-
volatility diffusions and yet there is an efficient limit equilibrium. However, the limit 
equilibrium must be trivial whenever the variances of the aggregate signals converge to 
the common limit at a sufficiently fast rate, and if there is enough aggregation of signals 
that we can apply an appropriate variant of the central limit theorem. The next result 
shows that the assumption of binomial signals plus some technical assumptions does lead 
to  this  result,  where  the  “enough  aggregation  of  signals”  condition  is  that 
( ) ( )/ k ∆ = ∆ ∆ τ grows quickly enough that  2/7
0 lim ( )exp( ( ) ) k ∆→ ∆ ∆ → ∞ τ . 
Proposition 4: Suppose  
(i)  2/7
0 lim ( )exp( ( ) ) k ∆→ ∆ ∆ → ∞ τ  
(ii)  the  signals  are  sums  of  i.i.d.  binomials  ( ) j Z ∆   where  the  common  outcomes  are 
( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ ,  and  the  probability  of  ( ) x ∆   under  action  1, 1 i = + −   is  ( ) i ∆ α   with 
0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α  





= ∆ ∑ converge to non-degenerate diffusions with drifts  
µi  and volatilities 
2 σi .  
Then all limit equilibria are trivial.   12 
Proof Sketch: The proof is in Appendix 3, here is a rough outline: The idea is to use the 
central limit theorem and a continuity argument to extend our earlier result that the limit 
equilibrium is trivial when the underlying signal structure is a pair of diffusions with 
equal  volatility.    If  we  could  restrict  the  analysis  to  strategies  where  the  cutoff  for 
punishment was fixed relative to the standard error of the signal the proof would be 
straightforward,  but  we  have  to  also  consider  punishment  cutoffs  that  become  large 
relative to the standard error. This requires us to use a “large deviations” argument that 
extends an argument from Feller [1972] from the sum of i.i.d random variable to the case 
of triangular arrays.   
To understand why this result is needed, recall that the usual central limit theorem 
concludes that the probability  ( ) n F x  that the normalized sum of n  draws is below any 
fixed  x  converges to the probability  ( ) x Φ  that a standard normal variable is below  x .  
















when  n x   is  not  fixed  but  rather  limn n x →∞ = ∞  at  a  rate  slowly  enough  that 
1/6 0 n n x − → .  Feller’s  result  does  not  directly  apply  to  our  setting,  because  the 
distribution of the underlying variables changes with the period length; we report the 
extension of his result to our case of triangular arrays in Fudenberg and Levine [2007b].  
  The proof also uses a sharpening of Proposition 3, reported in Lemma A.2.1: not 
only do the two binomial arrays converge to diffusions with a common volatility, the 
variances of the two signal processes converge to equality sufficiently quickly for our  
argument to be valid.    ￿ 
   
Proposition  4  assumes  that 2/7
0 lim ( )exp( ( ) ) 0 k ∆→ ∆ ∆ = τ .  Without  this 
condition, we cannot use the normal approximation, so we do not have a general result. 
However, one important special case is the binomial construction of diffusions found in 
many  textbooks,  such  as  Stokey  [2008].  Here  1/2 ( ) ( ) x y ∆ = − ∆ = ∆ σ ,  and 
1/2 ( ) .5 .5 / α µ σ ∆ = + ∆ , and the triangular array converges to a diffusion with drift  µ 
and volatility 2 σ .   In this case it is clear how the assumption that the support of the 
binomials is the same under both actions forces the two diffusions to have the same 
volatilities, and moreover we can determine what happens when k  is small.    13 
Proposition 5: If the player’s signals are as in the standard binomial construction of 
diffusions and  0 lim ( ) ( ) 0 k ∆→ ∆ ∆ = τ  then there are only trivial limit equilibria. 
Proof:  Assume that the drift  1 µ−  under action  1 −  exceeds the drift  1 µ+  under action 
+1. (The case  1 1 µ µ − + <  is symmetric and it is obvious that there is only a trivial limit 
equilibrium when the drifts are equal.) For any finite number  k  of signals, the largest 
possible value of  ( )/ q p p ρ = −  is obtained with strategies that punish only if the sum 
equals kh so that every realization was  h + .  Recall that we must have the case of equal 
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. 
This goes to zero if the log of the first term goes to zero. We calculate 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
[ ] [ ] ( )
( ) ( )
1/2 1/2
0 1 1 1 1
1/2 1/2
0 1 1 1 1
1/2
0 1 1 1
lim ( )log .5 .5 ( )/ ( ) / ( )log .5 .5 ( )/ ( ) /
lim ( ) ( )/ ( ) / ( )/ ( ) /
lim ( ) ( ) / 0
k k k k
k k k
k
µ τ σ µ τ σ
µ τ σ µ τ σ
τ µ µ σ
∆→ − + + +
∆→ − + + +
∆→ − + +
∆ + ∆ ∆ − ∆ + ∆ ∆ =
∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ ∆ =
∆ ∆ − =
 
where the last equality follows from  0 lim ( ) ( ) 0 k ∆→ ∆ ∆ = τ  . Thus by corollary 1b, there 
is only a trivial limit equilibrium.                                                                                    ￿ 
 
Proposition 5’s hypothesis that  0 lim ( ) ( ) 0 k ∆→ ∆ ∆ = τ  overlaps with Proposition 
4’s  hypothesis  that  2/7
0 lim ( )exp( ( ) ) k ∆→ ∆ ∆ → ∞ τ ,  so  combining  the  two  results 
gives a complete characterization of the limit of standard binomials:  
Corollary  3:  If  the  player’s  signals  are  as  in  the  standard  binomial  construction  of 
diffusions then there are only trivial limit equilibria. 
To relate this result to the previous one, and to our earlier general analysis, note 
that  when  0 lim ( ) ( ) 0 k ∆→ ∆ ∆ > τ ,  the  sequence  of  strategies  “only  punish  if  every 
outcome  was  h + ”  has  a  limiting  value  of  ρ   that  is  non-zero.  However,  along  this 
sequence we have  / 0 q τ → , so as Corollary 2a shows this is no help.    14 
5. Trinomial Informational Limits 
While some data, such as sale or no sale, may have a binomial distribution, other 
data, such as the number of units sold, or their price, will generally have more than two 
values. The simplest case beyond the binomial is the trinomial: we shall see that the 
trinomial breaks the link between the volatilities under the two different actions, so the 
equal  variance/degenerate  limit  case  seems  to  be  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule. 
Moreover,  in  these  more  general  limits,  the  equilibria  of  the  game  with  the  limiting 
diffusion do not correspond to the limit of the equilibria when the signal is the aggregate 
of many small events. This suggests that the continuous time game is “too small” to 
capture  all  of  the  more  general  ways  that  signal  processes  can  be  approximated  by 
diffusions.  
Fix a pair of drifts  1 1 , + − µ µ  and a pair of volatilities 2 2
1 1 , + − σ σ . We will construct a 
particular family of pairs of trinomials such that each trinomial converges to a diffusion 
with the corresponding drift and volatility, and use this family to explore various ways of 
passing to the continuous time limit.  We focus on three simple cases: a “bad news” case 
where the drifts are equal and deviating increases the volatility; a “good news” case with 
equal drifts where deviating decreases the volatility, and the case of equal volatilities and 
unequal drifts.  
The pairs of signal processes will be indexed by a free parameter  γ  that is not 
determined by the limit diffusions. For any  1 γ ≥ , we set  2 2
1 1 max( , ) + − = γ γ σ σ . Now 
consider  a  pair  of  trinomial  distributions  with  the  same  three  possible  outcomes, 
( ),0, ( ) x h h = − ∆ ∆ ,  where  ∆  is  the  period  length    and  1/2 1/2 ( ) h γ ∆ = ∆ .  The 
probability  distributions  on  the  outcomes  depends  on  action  1, 1 i = + − ,  and  γ   as 
follows: The probability of outcome 0 is  2 ( )/ i i α γ σ γ = − , independent of  ∆ (note 













∆ = + . 
  A simple example may help put this in perspective. The sign of x  and the size of 
the step are simply normalizations so that the normalized signals converge to a diffusion,   15 
so we may think of the underlying data as “0 sales” corresponding to  ( ) x h = − ∆ , “a 
single sale” corresponding to  0 x =  and “a double sale” corresponding to  ( ) x h = + ∆ . 
Let us focus on the bad new case where  1 1 σ σ − + > , and take  1 1 2, 1 − + = = σ σ  and 
2 γ = . Then  4 γ = ,  1 1 3/4, 1/2 + − = = α α , so that a sale is more likely if action  1 +  
is taken. Ignoring the “small noise term” of order  1/2 ∆ , the probability of no sale or a 
double sale when  1 a = +  is  1/8, and when  1 a = −  the probability of no sale or a 
double sale is  1/4. That is, action +1 increases the likelihood of a single sale at the 
expense of both no sales and double sales.   
As  we  shall  see,  in  both  the  bad  news  and  good  news  cases,  the  per-event 
informativeness of the individual events is constant as  0 ∆ → . In the bad news case the 
informativeness of the best test, and thus the best limit equilibrium payoff, is independent 
of the parameter γ . However, in the good news case  γ  determines the informativeness 
of the best test and also the best limit equilibrium payoff.  
The good and bad news cases also differ in their aggregation properties: In the 
bad news case, aggregating more signals leads to a more informative test; so that when 
/ k τ = ∆ → ∞  the  best  equilibrium  approaches  full  efficiency;  which  is  the  result  
when players observe a diffusion. In the good news case, aggregating more signals can 
lead to a less informative test, and the effect of aggregation is ambiguous, and depends on 
the “free” parameter γ . 
  To  analyze  the  trinomial  example,  we  begin  by  computing  the  means  and 
variances. We let  i E  denote the expectation conditional on action i. Then the expected 






( ) 0 (1 )( )
(2 (1 ))
i j i i i i
i i
i i i
E Z h h
h
h
∆ = + + − − −
= − −
∆ ∆
= = ∆ = ∆
β α α β
β α
µ µ γ µ
γ γ
 
and the variances are   
 
( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
[ ( ) ] [ ( )] (1 )
(1 )
i j i j i i
i i
i i
E Z E Z h ∆ − ∆ = − − ∆





   16 
Thus if we hold fixed the actions up to a real time t, the sum of the process up to time t  
has  mean  it µ   and  variance  2 2
i i t t σ µ − ∆,  which  converges  to  2
it σ   as  ∆  goes  to  0. 
Moreover, if we look at the sum up to time  ( ) τ ∆ , where  ( )/ τ ∆ ∆ goes to infinity, we 
again have a triangular array, so the position at  ( ) τ ∆  is again described approximately by 
a normal.  
5.1: Bad news case:  
2 2
1 1 σ σ − + >   
In the bad news case, we can show that if the ratio of volatilities is sufficiently 
large then the limit equilibrium is non-trivial, regardless of the amount of information 
aggregation. We also show that if the amount of aggregation, as measured by the ratio 
/ k τ = ∆, goes to infinity, then the first best can be approximated arbitrarily closely, so 
there is an efficient patient equilibrium. Of course full efficiency is not possible with a 
finite amount of information aggregation. This shows that the limit equilibria are not 
determined by the assumptions that the limit distribution of the signals is a fixed pair of 
diffusions and that the τ  and ∆ both go to zero. Finally, by allowing the variance of the 
trinomials to converge to a common limit as τ  and  ∆ go to zero, we can construct a 
sequence of games with an efficient limit equilibrium even though the limit information 
structure  –  a  diffusion  with  common  volatilities  –  has  only  a  trivial  equilibrium.  To 
simplify the presentation, we restrict attention to the case where both diffusions have zero 
drift, but this is not important for the results.  
To begin consider  ( ) τ ∆ = ∆. Since the bad action has a higher volatility, and the  
two actions both have zero means, the best equilibrium payoff for period length  τ = ∆ 
can  be  attained  with  a  strategy  that  punishes  with  some  positive  probability  ( ) π ∆  
following the signals  h +  and  h −  and punishes with probability zero when the signal is 
0. (The likelihood ratio for punishing on 0 is less than one, and the symmetry of the 
problem means that treating  h +  and  h −  symmetrically is one of the solutions to the 
linear programming problem that defines the optimum). Such strategies have signal to 
noise ratio  
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α γσ σ σ
ρ
α γσ σ
,    17 
independent  of  γ ,    γ ,  ∆,  and  ( ) π ∆ .  If  π   is  a  constant  independent  of  ∆  then 
1 1 ) p π α+ = ( −  is independent of  ∆ as well. Hence by Corollary 1c these strategies 
support  a  non-trivial  limit  equilibrium  for  interest  rate  r   if  the  ratio,  2 2
1 1 / σ σ − +   is 
sufficiently large.  Moreover the simple form of the observation structure here lets us 
compute the best limit equilibrium payoff: Since no choice of cutoff can yield a higher 

























Now consider  2 τ = ∆. Here the most informative test is to punish only if the 
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independent  of  ∆, and since the punishment probability is also independent of  ∆ we 
again  have  a  non-trivial  equilibrium.  Moreover,  because  the  maximal  value  of  ρ  
(consistent with non-zero punishment probability) has increased, aggregating two signals 
allows a better limit equilibrium payoff.  
Now consider the case 
1/2 τ = ∆  so that  1/2 ( ) k − ∆ = ∆ → ∞ as  0 ∆ → .Here 
we make use of the following more general result: 
Proposition 6: In the bad news case ( 1 1 / 1 σ σ − + > ) if  0 lim ( )/ τ ∆→ ∆ ∆ = ∞ there is 
an efficient limit equilibrium. 
Proof:  Our  previous  paper  showed  that  there  is  an  efficient  limit  equilibrium  when 
players observe the state of a bad-news diffusion process; the proof uses that fact and a 
continuity argument to  construct a sequence of equilibria satisfying the conditions of 
Corollary 2c. See Appendix 5 for details.                                                                           18 
Corollary  4:  There  are  sequences  of  information  structures  with  efficient  limit 
equilibrium where players observe the sum of discrete events, and these sums converge to 
a pair of diffusions with the same volatilities. 
Proof:  The idea is to use a diagonalization argument to obtain a sequence of trinomials 
where the ratio of variances goes to 1 sufficiently slowly that there is an efficient limit. 
To do this, consider a sequence  2 2
1 1 { / } 1 n n n σ σ − + ↓  and to each 
2 2
1 1 ( , ) n n − + σ σ  associate a 
trinomial signal structure distribution  { } n S
∆ ∆  as defined above, so that the sum of the 
public signal under information structure  , n S ∆ converges to a pair of diffusions with drift 
0  and  volatilities 
2 2
1 1 , σ σ − + .    Let  n G ∆  be  the  game  with  event  frequency  1/∆, 
information structure  n S ∆, and period length 
1/2 ( ) τ ∆ = ∆ . From Proposition 6, for any 
sequence of strictly positive  0 n ε → , there is a sequence of PPE  n P ∆ for the  n G ∆ with  
limit payoff  n u ε −  as  0 ∆ → . 
  Now  we  diagonalize:  For  each  j,  pick  j ∆   so  that 
j j P ∆   has  payoff  at  least 
2 j u ε − ; let 
j j j G G ∆ ≡  be the corresponding game; then the sequence of games  { } j G  
has a sequence of PPE 
j j P ∆  with payoffs converging to u .                                            ￿ 
 
This shows that conclusions based on the hypothesis that the variances are equal 
in  the  limit  do  not  apply  to  the  limit  of  the  equilibria  along  the  sequence  without 
additional information, such as the rate at which the variances become equal. 
5.2. Good News Case  2 2
1 1 σ σ − + <   
Once again, we simplify by setting the drifts equal to 0, and begin with the case 
( ) τ ∆ = ∆.  The optimal equilibrium with this signal structure prescribes punishment with 
positive probability when  0 j Z =  and zero probability of punishment on  , h h + − , so the 
signal to noise ratio is  
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q p
p
+ − + −
+ +
− − −
= = − =
− −
γσ σ σ σ
ρ
γ σ γ σ
. 
This is independent of ∆, but not independent of γ , even though γ  is not pinned down 
by the limit diffusion. As we will see, γ  will matter not only for the limit equilibria in the 
case of no information aggregation, but also for whether the best limit equilibrium payoff 
is improved by increased aggregation.    19 

















Note  that  ρ → ∞  as  1 γ → .  This  is  because  when  1 γ = ,  outcome  0  has 
probability zero under action +1, so incentives can be provided at no cost. Conversely,  
0 → ρ  as  → ∞ γ , because in this case outcome 0 occurs with probability near one 
regardless of the choice of action. 
A similar argument to that of the previous subsection shows that when there is a 















this case as a baseline we now investigate the effect of information aggregation on the 
limit equilibrium payoffs. 
The simplest case of information aggregation is  ( ) 2 τ ∆ = ∆. Because agents only 
observe  the  sum  of  the  two  periods  outcomes,  the  possible  signals  take  the  values 
{ 2, 1,0,1,2} − − .   As before, the payoffs in the optimal limit equilibria will depend on the 
highest possible limiting value of  1
q
p
= − ρ , so  we  want to determine the maximal 
value of  / q p .  
Even without a thorough analysis, it is immediate that aggregation hurts when 
1 γ = : Here when τ = ∆,  0 p = ,  ρ = ∞ , and the equilibrium is fully efficient, while 
clearly  0 p >   when  ( ) 2 τ ∆ = ∆, so that the highest attainable  ρ  is finite and thus the 
limit equilibrium payoff is bounded away from efficiency. 
At the other extreme, where γ → ∞, we have  1 p q = =  when τ = ∆, so that 
0 ρ =  and there is only the trivial equilibrium. In this case aggregating two signals could 
in principle lead to a higher value of  ρ  and a better limit equilibrium payoff. Appendix 5 
gives a detailed analysis of this case, and shows that for some parameter configurations 
aggregating two signals does indeed lead to a better limit equilibrium payoff, specifically 
in the case where  γ  is very large and the short-run gain to deviating, g,  is very small.   20 
  Now consider the case  1/2 ( ) τ ∆ = ∆ , so that the signals observed by the players 
in each period converge to a pair of diffusions. It is important to note that the properties 
of the limiting diffusion, and thus its limit equilibria, are independent of  γ . Thus by 
specifying  1 1
1







  (so  there  is  a  non  trivial  limit  equilibrium  for  the 
diffusion)  and  γ   large  we  can  construct  examples  where  there  is  only  the  trivial 
equilibrium when τ = ∆ and a non trivial limit when players aggregate infinitely many 
signals, while by specifying γ  near 1, and  1 σ−  near  1 σ+  , we have examples with a non 
trivial limit when  τ = ∆ and a trivial limit when players observe the diffusion. Thus 
there is no necessary connection between the equilibrium sets in the two cases, and the 
parameters  of  the  limit  diffusion  are  not  sufficient  to  determine  the  nature  of  the 
equilibrium set when players observe each realization of the underlying process. 
  We  should  also  point  out  that  when  1 1
1







,  so  that  the 
volatilities are in the interior of the range where the diffusion case has only trivial limit 
equilibria, then necessarily any sequence  2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 {( , )} ( , ) n n n σ σ σ σ + − + − →  will eventually 
lie in the interior of this range as well. We conjecture that we could thus use the large-
deviations  arguments  of  Appendix  3  to  show  that  any  sequence  of  trinomials  with 
variances converging to  2 2
1 1 , + − σ σ  as  0 ∆ →  will have only trivial equilibria. This result 
would leave open the question of whether the same conclusion holds for all processes that 
converge to the specified pair of diffusions. 
5.3. Equal variance, unequal mean 
Finally we turn to trinomials with equal variances and unequal means; this case 
will be very similar to the binomial case we discussed in Section 4. As there, we suppose 
that  the  bad  action  has  a  higher  mean.  With  equal  variances,  1 1 α α − + = ,  so 
( 1)/ = − α γ γ ; the standard binomial case corresponds to  1 γ =  and  0 α = . 
   We  begin  with  the  case  τ = ∆.  Here  the  best  equilibria  punish  when  the 













, so    21 
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Note that as  0 ∆ → ,  / 1 q p → , just as in the binomial case, and as there the underlying 
per-event  signal  becomes  completely  uninformative  in  the  limit.    As  in  the  proof  of 
Proposition 5, this implies that there is only the trivial equilibrium with any fixed level of 
aggregation, that is when  k τ = ∆. By analogy with our other results, we believe that this 
is also true when  0 lim / τ τ → ∆ = ∞, but since the result does not apply to sequences 
where the variances are only equal in the limit, we have not tried to provide a formal 
proof. 
6. Conclusion 
Many different arrays converge to a given diffusion process, and the limit equilibria 
of these arrays is not in general determined by the parameters of the limiting diffusions, 
but binomial arrays are an exception to this result. Thus the equilibria of continuous-time 
games where players monitor the state of a diffusion process are perhaps best thought of 
as  applying  to  cases  where  the  diffusion  specification  is  either  exact  or  arises  from 
aggregating binomial events.   
We have assumed throughout that players observe the aggregate of the process at 
each period; this is consistent with the idea that the diffusion comes from aggregation. If 
instead  players  do  not  merely  see  the  aggregate,  but  observe  the  entire  empirical 
cumulative distribution, they get the first-best limit payoff when volatilities are different 
and  / τ ∆ → ∞ regardless of the ratio of the volatilities. This parallels the observation 
that  observing  the  infinite-dimensional  path  of  a  diffusion  for  a  finite  time  interval 
reveals its volatility, which is what underlies the folk wisdom in the continuous time 
literature that any difference in volatilities leads to full efficiency. However, this full-
revelation argument requires that the entire path of the diffusion process is observed, and 
in many applications, only the aggregate is available as a public signal. For example, 
firms may have access to one another’s revenues or sales data through annual reports, 
which may possibly disaggregate down to the quarterly level, but firms do not generally 
have access to the individual sales data of their competitors, which are highly proprietary. 
Similarly, government reports many aggregates, ranging from money supply figures, to 
GDP, to hours worked, but the disaggregated data is quite closely held.   22 
 
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition 1: The most favorable PPE payoff 
* v is the largest value v  for which there 
is a function: : w → ￿ ￿  such that ( , ) v w  satisfies the constraints  
(C) 
(1 ) ( ) ( | 1)
(1 )( ) ( ) ( | 1)
( )
v u w z f z dz
v u g w z f z dz
v w z u
= − + +





δ δ  
or v u =  if no solution exists.  
This result was asserted but not proved in Fudenberg and Levine [2007a]. It was 
used to prove what is Proposition 2 in this paper, so a proof is needed to support our 
subsequent analysis. The reason a proof is needed is that the conclusion of the theorem 
applies to both pure and mixed equilibria, but only pure actions are considered in the 
program  (C).  This  simplification  is  possible  only  because  the  existence  of  a  public 
randomizing device implies that any payoff  ( ) w z  between  * v  and u can be attained by 
randomizing between the two equilibria.  
Proof: We need to show that it is sufficient to consider pure actions. Suppose that the 
best PPE for the long run player  gives more than the static Nash payoff, and fix an 
equilibrium that attains this payoff. In the first period of this equilibrium, the short-run 
player must play In with positive probability, so the long run player must play +1 with 
positive probability. Fix such an equilibrium, and suppose that the short-run player plays 
Out with positive probability in the first period. Since the short-run player’s actions are 
observed, the strategy profile where LR plays as in the original equilibrium and SR plays 
In with probability 1 in the first period and follows the original strategies thereafter is a 
PPE in which LR has a higher payoff, which shows that SR does not randomize in the 
first period of the best equilibrium. Finally, if the long-run player randomizes in the first 
period,  the  conditions  in  (C)  apply  to  every  action  in  the  support  of  the  first-period 
distribution, so the maximized value can be attained with a pure strategy. Finally, observe   23 
that we require only  ( ) v w z u ≥ ≥  since any payoff in between the best and worst can be 
attained with public randomization.                                                                                   ￿ 
Appendix 2: Binomial Convergence to Diffusions 
Here we prove some results about the convergence of binomials to diffusions needed in 
proving Proposition 4 in Appendix 3.  
Proposition 3: Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomials  ( ) j Z ∆  where the 
common  outcomes  are  ( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ ,  and  that  the  probability  of  ( ) x ∆   under  action 
1, 1 i = + −  is  ( ) i ∆ α  with  0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α . If under each action i the 





= ∆ ∑ converge to a diffusion with drift  i µ  and volatilities  
2
i σ  as  0 ∆ → , 
then 1 1 + − = σ σ . 
Proof:  First  we  examine  what  it  means  for  the  sum  of  the  ( ) j Z ∆   to  converge  to  a 
diffusion  under  action  +1.  It  is  convenient  to  replace  the  parameters  , x y   with  the 
parameters  1 1 , 0 ∆ ∆
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With  this  new  parametrization,  we  can  calculate  that  1 1 ( ) j E Z ∆
+ + ∆ = ∆ µ   and 
( )
2
1 1 var ( ) j Z ∆
+ + ∆ = ∆ σ . 
If the limit process is a diffusion, then its position at t  has the normal distribution 
with  mean  1 µ+ ,  variance 
2
1 σ+ .  With  the  reparameterization,  this  is  equivalent  to 
1 1
∆
+ + → µ µ  and  1 1
∆
+ + → σ σ . As an illustration, consider the standard binomial limit 
discussed  in  section  4:  Here  we  have  1/2
1 x y + = − = ∆ σ ,  and 
1/2
1 1 1 (1 / )/2 + + + = + ∆ α µ σ , so  1 1
∆
+ + = µ µ  and ( )
2 2 2
1 1 1 ( ) ( ) / 1/ ∆
+ + +   = − ∆   σ σ µ  
  Now we examine a second sequence of binomial distributions that converges to a 
different diffusion process with mean  1 µ−  and variance 
2
1 σ− .  As we discussed earlier, it   24 
is important that this second sequence has the same increments  ( ), ( ) x y ∆ ∆ ; otherwise, a 
single realization could be fully informative. So we now have   
(A1) 
1 1 1/2 1/2
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1/2 1/2
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 ( ) 1 ( )
x
y
+ − ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ + − −
+ −
+ − ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ + − −
+ −
− ∆ − ∆
∆ = ∆ + ∆ = ∆ + ∆
∆ ∆
∆ ∆
∆ = ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − ∆
− ∆ − ∆
α α
µ σ µ σ
α α
α α
µ σ µ σ
α α
 
We  now  solve  this  system  to  see  the  possible  values  of  1 1 , ( ) ∆
− − ∆ σ α   as  a  function 
of 1 1 1 1 , , , ( ) ∆ ∆ ∆





1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 ( ) 1 ( )
α α
µ µ σ σ
α α
α α
µ µ σ σ
α α
+ − ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ − + −
+ −
+ − ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ − + −
+ −
− ∆ − ∆
− ∆ + =
∆ ∆
∆ ∆
− ∆ − = −
− ∆ − ∆
 
 Divide the two equations to eliminate  1 σ∆
− , solve for  1( ) α− ∆  and plug back in to the 
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+ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ + −
+ + ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
− + − +




− − ∆   − ∆ − ∆   = − ∆ +      ∆ − ∆   + − ∆
∆
. 
Since  0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α , and it follows that  1 1
∆
− + → σ σ .   ￿ 
Lemma A2.1: Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomials  ( ) j Z ∆  where the 
common  outcomes  are  ( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ ,  and  that  the  probability  of  ( ) x ∆   under  action 
1, 1 i = + −  is  ( ) i ∆ α  with  0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α . If under each action i the 





= ∆ ∑ converge to a diffusion with drift  i µ  and volatilities  
2
i σ  as  0 ∆ → , 
then  














Proof:  Since  
 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1/5 1/5
| | | || |
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ − + − + − − − +
=
∆ ∆
σ σ σ σ σ σ
    25 
and  1 1 1 | | 2 ∆ ∆
+ − + + → σ σ σ , this is the same as  1/5
1 1 | | / 0 σ σ ∆ ∆
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+ + − +


















Algebraic manipulation leads to 
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1 1 1 1 1




1 1 1 1/10
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| | | 2 ( ) 1 |
lim lim
1 ( ) 1 ( )
2
( ) ( )
| | | 2 ( ) 1 |
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2 (1 ( ))







∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
+ − + − + ∆
∆→ ∆→ +






− − ∆ ∆ −
= =





Since  0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i α α α ∆→ ∆ = < <  the result follows.    
￿ 
Using  the  central  limit  theorem,  the  conditions  1 1 1 1 , ∆ ∆
+ + + + → → µ µ σ σ   and  
1 1 1 ( ) ,0 1 + + + ∆ → < < α α α   can  be  shown  to  be  sufficient  for  a  triangular  array  to 
converge to a diffusion. To construct a non-standard binomial array with the probabilities 
of  the  two  steps  not  converging  to  1/2,  it  is  convenient  to  set 
1 1 1 1 1 1 , , ( ) ∆ ∆
+ + + + + + = = ∆ = µ µ σ σ α α .  Using  our  alternative  parametrization  from 
above we find for example that if  1 1 1 0, 1, 1/3 + + + = = = µ σ α , we have the binomial 
taking on the values  1/2 1/2 ( ) 2 , ( ) ( 2/2) x y ∆ = ∆ ∆ = − ∆  with probability of  ( ) x ∆  
equal to 1/3, which generate a triangular array that converges to a diffusion with drift  0 
and volatility 1. 
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4 
As in the text, we consider a sequence of games with both the event period ∆ and 
the observation period  ( ) τ ∆  converging to 0, and define  ( ) ( )/ k τ ∆ = ∆ ∆. Note that 
condition (i) of Proposition 4 requires that  0 lim ( ) k ∆→ ∆ = ∞; we will maintain that 
restriction throughout this appendix. We start by summarizing some notation and key 
results  from  other  places.  Recall  that  when  players  observe  the  state  of  a  diffusion   26 
process at discrete intervals, the signals are normally distributed; let  ,φ Φ  respectively 
denote the c.d.f. and density of the standard normal distribution.  
Fact  1  [Fudenberg  and  Levine  [2007a]  Proposition  2]:  Suppose  the  signals  are 
normally distributed with means  1 a τ −  and variance 
2 σ τ . Then for any  0 0 ρ > ,  0 ρ ρ >  
implies  / 0 q τ →  and so there is no non-trivial limit equilibrium. 
For a fixed distribution F, let   ( ) log ( ) x




ζ ψ ζ   be  the  logarithm  of  the 
generating  function.  We  will  be  interested  in  the  distributions  corresponding  to  the 
binomial distributions referred to in Proposition 4: In this case we have  
  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) log (1 ) x y e e ∆ − ∆
∆ ∆ ∆ = + − ζ ζ ψ ζ α α  
Fact  2  [Large  Deviations  Theorem  for  Triangular  Arrays,  from  Fudenberg  and 
Levine [2007b]] : Suppose that for each n  there is a sequence  n
i Z 1, , j n = …  of  . . . iid  
random  variables  with  zero  mean,  variance  2
n σ   and  distribution  n F ,  and  that 
1
n n
n j j z Z
= = ∑ has  distribution  n F ∗,  while  the  normalized  sum  / n n z n σ   has 
distribution  n F . If 
1. For some  0 s >  and all  0 s ζ ≤ ≤  there is a continuous function  2( ) 0 ψ ζ >  and 
constant  0 B >   such  that  0 lim sup ''( ) ( ) 0 n s n →∞ ≤ ≤ − → ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ and 
2
0 sup | '''( ) |,| ''''( ) || '''''( ) | s n n n B ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ ζ ψ ζ ζ ≤ ≤ <  




n n M E Z M ≡ → < ∞ 
3.  1/6 0 n n x − →  
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 In  what  follows,  we  will  take  the  limit  on  k → ∞  rather  than  0 ∆ → ,  implicitly 
considering a sequence  0 k → τ , with  / k k k ∆ = τ  and  ( )
k k
j j Z Z = ∆ .
16  As in the proof 
of Proposition 3 we define new parameters  k k
i i j E Z µ = ,( )
2
var / k k k
i i j Z σ = ∆ . 
We are interested in applying the Large Deviation Theorem to 
1 ˆ
k k k
j j z Z
= ≡ ∑ . 
This leads us to define 











so that  2 2 0,var ( ) k k k
ij ij i i EZ Z σ σ = = → ￿ ￿  and the values taken on by the reparameterized 


















  − ∆   =      ∆  












k i i x →∞ = σ : the reparameterized binomial has step size tending to a non-
zero constant. 
Lemma  A.3.1:  Consider  two  i.i.d.  binomials  ( ) j Z ∆   with  common  outcomes  
( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ , where  the probability of  ( ) x ∆  under action  1, 1 i = + −  is  ( ) i ∆ α  with 






= ∆ ∑ converges to a diffusion with drift  i µ  and volatilities  
2
i σ  as  0 ∆ → , then 
the reparameterized binomials satisfy conditions 1 and 2 of the large deviations theorem 
for both  1, 1 i = − + . 
Proof: We consider the case  1 i = + , the case  1 i = −  is identical save for notation. The 





1 ( ) ( )
( ) log ( )exp (1 ( ))exp
( ) 1 ( )
k k
k k k k




         − ∆ ∆              = ∆ + − ∆ −                   ∆ − ∆             
α α
ψ ζ α ζσ α ζσ
α α
 
                                                 












         −            = + − −                       −       
α α
ψ ζ α ζσ α ζσ
α α
. 
Because  1 1 ( )
k
+ + ∆ → α α   and  k
i i σ σ → ,  we  know  that 
0 ˆ lim sup ''( ) "( ) 0 k s k →∞ ≤ ≤ − → ζ ψ ζ ψ ζ  so the first part of condition 1 is satisfied, and 
it is clear by inspection that the other necessary conditions hold as well. 
￿ 
We turn now to the main proof. The idea is to show that if there were strategies that led to 
a non-trivial limit equilibrium in the binomial case, we could construct a non-trivial limit 
equilibrium when players observe the position of a diffusion. There are several details 
that need to be attended to in order for this argument to work. First, the approximating 
normals corresponding to the two different actions will have different variances, while 
Fact 1 supposes that the variances are equal before the limit is reached. Lemma A.2.1 
adds a condition on the rate of convergence that enables us to extend Fact 1 to the case 
where the variances are different before the limit is reached. Moreover, while we know 
that within each period z  is converging to a normal, the cutoff for punishment might be 
going to infinity, so the standard central limit theorem does not apply. Hence we use the 
large deviation theorem described above. The idea is to show that if the cutoff grows 
faster than  1/6 k  the probability of punishment is so low that it cannot sustain a non-trivial 
equilibrium, while if it grows at  1/6 k  the normal approximation is so good that we can 
make use of Fact 1. 
  First we give a Lemma needed to deal with variances that are unequal before the 
limit is reached. 









−     −Φ     
→






proof: Observe from L’Hopital’s rule that if x → ∞ then (1 ( ))/ ( ) 0 x x φ −Φ → . Using 
that  fact,  we  may  again  apply  L’Hopital’s  rule  to  see  that  
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−     −Φ    −Φ  
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  − −    =       
￿
￿




Lemma A.3.3: When the signal is the sum of binomials with common support, and action 
-1 has a higher mean, the monotone likelihood ratio property is satisfied for the pair of 
signals. 
Proof: This is well known and can be verified by directly calculating the likelihood ratio. 
for the multinomial sum of binomials.  ￿ 





















Since  the  MLRP  is  satisfied,  we  may  assume  a  strategy  of  the  form  “punish”  if 
1
k k z ζ + > ￿ .  
Lemma  A.3.4:  If  1/6 liminf 0 k
k k−
→∞ > ζ and  2/7 exp( ) 0 k k → τ   then  / 0 p τ → , 
/ 0 q τ → .   30 
Proof: It suffices to prove  / 0 q τ →  since q p ≥ . To compute q , we need to consider  
the distribution of  1
k z+ ￿  when the action taken is –1. This does not have zero mean or unit 
variance, so we renormalize, defining 
1




k k k k k





− + − +
−
− − ∆ ￿ ￿ ,  which  has  zero 
mean and unit variance when the action taken is –1. Denote the c.d.f. of this random 
variable when the action is –1 by  k G ; we may potentially apply the large deviations 

















so that   1 ( ) k k k q G x = − . However, since  1/6 lim 0 kk− > ζ ,  1 1 | | 0 k k
+ − − → σ σ  and  k
i µ  
is  bounded,  we  see  that  1/6 lim 0 k
k x k−
→∞ > .  Hence  we  set  1/7 2 k x k = π ,  and 
because  1/6 0 k k x − → ,  we  know  that  k k x x ≤   for  large  enough  k,  and  that  the 
conditions 3,4 of the large deviations theorem above are satisfied for  k x . It follows that 











 so for large enough k  we have  
  ( )
2









Since  1/7 2 k x k = π , we have that  2/7 / ( exp( )) 0 p C k ≤ → τ τ    ￿ 
Now we can prove Proposition 4, which we restate for convenience. 
Proposition 4: Suppose  
(i)  2/7
0 lim ( )exp( ( ) ) k ∆→ ∆ ∆ → ∞ τ  
(ii) the signals are sums of  i.i.d. binomials  ( ) j Z ∆  where the common outcomes are 
( ) ( ) x y ∆ > ∆ ,  and  the  probability  of  ( ) x ∆   under  action  1, 1 i = + −   is  ( ) i ∆ α   with 
0 lim ( ) ,0 1 i i i ∆→ ∆ = < < α α α  





= ∆ ∑ converges to a non-degenerate diffusion with 
drifts  µi  and volatilities 
2 σi .    31 
Then all limit equilibria are trivial. 
Proof: By Lemma A.3.3 the signals satisfy the MLRP, so we can restrict attention to 
strategies that punish when the observed signal exceeds some cutoff. By Lemma A.3.4 if 





→∞ = . By 
Lemma A.3.1 and Fact 2, this means that we may compute  / , / , p q τ τ ρ  asymptotically 
using normal distributions. From Lemma A.2.1 
















so that   ( ) ( )
2 2 1/5
1 1 lim | | 0 k k
k k →∞ + − − = σ σ . Since  1/6 lim 0 k
k k−
→∞ = ζ , 
1/5 lim 0 k
k k−
→∞ = ζ  and so   ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 lim | | 0 k k k
k→∞ + − − = ζ σ σ . Consequently 
Lemma A.3.2 applies, so that we may assume that the normals have the same variance, 
implying a non-trivial limit in that case. This contradicts Fact 1.  ￿ 
Appendix 4:  Aggregating Two Good- News Signals  
We want to show that aggregating two trinomial good-news signals leads to a 
better limit equilibrium payoff when γ  is very large and the short-run gain to deviating, 
g ,  is  very  small.  To  do  this  we  determine  the  best  limit  equilibrium  payoff  when 
aggregating two signals. 
Punishing  when  the  sum  of  the  signals  is  -2    and  +2  will  minimize  and  not 
maximize the target ratio, and with a 0 mean the signals -1 and +1 are symmetric. Thus it 
will be enough to determine  / q p  for the signals 0 and +1. To do this we first calculate q  













Z h h h h
= = = − − =
−





This is minimized at  1/3 i α = , where it has value 1/3. Next 
2
1,2 Pr( 1) (1 ) i j i i i i j Z
= = = − = − ∑ α α α α .  This is maximized at ½.   32 













, and if 
























=   for  a  single 


























so unsurprisingly (0,1) and (1,0) are less informative than (0).  















Note  that  1 1 α α − + >   because  we  are  in  the  good  news  case.  Observing  that  all  the 
expressions  are  non-negative  we  can  write  this  as 
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
3 1 2 3 1 2 α α α α
α α
+ + − −
− +
+ − + −
< . The same function  







appears on both the left and right hand side of this inequality. Its derivative is  
2 2
2
6 2 3 1 2
'( ) f
− − − +
=
α α α α
α
α
, so  '(1) 0 f > , and thus when   1 1 α α + − <  and both 
are sufficiently close to 1, we have   1 1 ( ) ( ) f f − + > α α ; since  1 1 , 1 α α + − →  as γ → ∞, 
aggregating two signals together  improves the best likelihood ratio  as γ → ∞. On the 
other hand, the maximized value of this likelihood decreases to 1 as γ → ∞.  Thus for 
some payoff functions, the values of  γ  for which aggregating two signals improves the 
likelihood ratio may be so large that even with two signals there is only a trivial limit 
equilibrium. On the other hand, aggregation can allow a switch from non trivial to trivial 















, and    33 
the one period likelihood ratio is just  on the edge of the region that supports a non trivial 
limit. 
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 6 
Proposition  6:  In  the  bad  news  case  ( 1 1 / 1 σ σ − + > )  if  0 lim ( )/ τ ∆→ ∆ ∆ = ∞  then 
there is an efficient limit equilibrium. 
 




j j z Z
∆    
















= . The proof of Proposition 4 of Fudenberg and Levine [2007a] 
shows that when the observed outcomes correspond to observing the limit diffusions, 
specifying a fixed and large value of  * ζ  makes  ( ) p τ  a constant independent of τ and 
0 lim ( )/ ( ) q p → τ τ τ  as large as we like. Let   * * ( ), ( ) q p τ τ  denote the values of q   and p 
computed when players observe the position of the limit diffusions and use strategies 
with a fixed normalized cutoff  * ζ , and  let  ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) q p τ τ τ τ ∆ ∆  denote the punishment 
probabilities when the outcomes correspond to observing the sum of  / ( ) τ τ ∆  draws of the 
Z
∆ and the same cut-off rule is used. Since we have assumed  0 lim ( )/ τ ∆→ ∆ ∆ = ∞, 
and the cutoff  * ζ  is fixed relative to the standard errors, we can apply the central limit 
theorem to conclude these probability distributions converge to a normal, so we obtain 
the same limit values of  ( )/ q p p ρ = −  along the triangular arrays corresponding to 
( ) τ ∆  as we do in the diffusion limit. Consequently, the proof from the earlier paper’s 
Proposition 4 shows that there is an efficient limit equilibrium.               ￿   34 
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